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Rethinking the Real with
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SARAH KAREEM
I saw some few stalks of something green shooting out of the ground, which I fancy’d
might be some plant I had not seen, but I was surpris’d and perfectly astonish’d, when,
after a little longer time, I saw about ten or twelve ears come out, which were perfect
green barley of the same kind as our European, nay, as our English barley.
––Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe
In this oft-discussed moment from Daniel Defoe’s celebrated novel in which
Robinson Crusoe marvels at the English barley that sprouts on the Caribbean
island on which he is marooned, the ordinary becomes briefly available as an object
of wonder. Defoe re-creates linguistically the surprise he describes by narrating
Crusoe’s astonishment but delaying the revelation of that astonishment’s object;
Defoe’s language incrementally identifies the barley, moving from the general
(‘‘some few stalks of something green’’) to the plant’s distinguishing characteristics
(its ‘‘ears’’), to naming it within ever more culturally specific frames (‘‘our European,
nay . . . our English barley’’ [63; emphasis added]). The buildup of the expectation
that the object is worthy of astonishment intensifies the surprise when the barley’s
quotidian identity is revealed. The moment of the barley’s identification reorients
wonder from a response appropriate to foreign marvels to a possible way of view-
ing the familiar English plant. Although Crusoe’s wonder initially wanes upon
coming to the conclusion that the barley is no miracle, he eventually reveals a
capacity to view it, and other such ordinary providences, ‘‘as if it had been mirac-
ulous’’; he will describe the corn’s growth as ‘‘next to miraculous,’’ with no implied
waning of wonder for all that the miracle is but a virtual one (106).
This episode encapsulates a pervasive phenomenon within eighteenth-century
fiction: the cultivation of wonder as a response to the ordinary in a manner con-
sistent with David Hume’s critique of induction. Developing this claim, this essay
will show how Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) and Hume’s skeptical philosophy
use the narrative mode of Protestant spiritual autobiography and the figure of the
shipwreck in order to evoke the sense, central to Puritan theology, of life’s con-
tingency. By contingency I mean the sense, from the limited mortal’s perspective, of
persistent uncertainty regarding not only one’s own salvation but also the very
nature and duration of the laws that govern creation. This contingency renders life’s
continuity wondrous. In both Defoe and Hume, the cognitive uncertainty that
Puritan spiritual autobiography cultivates—by emphasizing life’s contingency—
takes on a metafictional dimension because each text uses the autobiographical
mode in ways that cast doubt upon their own truth status. The use of this narrative
mode produces an epistemological indeterminacy that replicates the indeterminacy
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that both Crusoe and Hume’s philosophical persona face. Each responds to this
indeterminacy with a provisional belief in which one assents while recognizing the
illusoriness of that to which one assents. This provisional belief creates a paradigm
for the assent that fiction itself solicits. The wonder discussed here has a degree
of epistemological anxiety because of the uncertainty regarding fiction’s proto-
cols, and yet each work models ways in which this epistemological anxiety can be
recuperated as aesthetic pleasure, creating the basis for fiction as an aesthetic mode
grounded in the experience of ‘‘as-ifness.’’1
This argument presents an alternative to several important views of Hume’s
relationship to eighteenth-century fiction. Reading Defoe and Hume for their
shared emphasis upon the wonder of a contingent universe revises Ian Watt’s
classic presentation of Defoe and Hume as ideological opposites (Rise 92). Reading
Defoe and Hume together also departs from the well-established critical tradition
of viewing fictional texts as exemplifications of earlier philosophical paradigms.2
Most recently in this vein, Ian Duncan has identified in Hume a philosophical
framework for early nineteenth-century fictional realism (124, 133). Working with a
view of Hume that is similar to Duncan’s, this essay suggests that we read Hume as
both theorizing and participating in representational practices immanent in early
eighteenth-century fiction.3 Watt, after all, presents Defoe as initiating the fictional
realism that Duncan argues Hume theorizes. To be clear, I do not intend to suggest
that Crusoe directly influenced Hume. Rather, both Defoe and Hume channel the
spiritual allegory of the pilgrim as shipwrecked traveler, an allegory that obtains
prominence via the discourse of Puritan spiritual autobiography as well as the
influence of shipwreck narratives such as the Arabic philosophical novel Hayy Ibn
Yaqzan and the story cycle of Sinbad the Sailor from The Arabian Nights.
In making the case that both Defoe’s fiction and the Humean critique of
induction have the effect of reframing the ordinary as an object of wonder, I
intervene in the long-standing discussion over Enlightenment and ‘‘the disen-
chantment of the world.’’4 Ever since Max Weber first articulated his so-called
disenchantment thesis, critics have refuted his thesis on various grounds, arguing
that supernatural forms of enchantment never really died out in the Enlightenment,
that enchantment vanishes from the natural world only to take up residence cov-
ertly in other spheres, and that enchantment becomes thoroughly and explicitly
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1 On fictionality’s relationship to the ‘‘as if,’’ see Paul Ricoeur 45, Wolfgang Iser 217–23, and John
Bender 231. Iser draws upon Hans Vaihinger’s The Philosophy of ‘‘As If’’ but emphasizes, contra
Vaihinger, that as-ifness is not something that one unmasks but something that the fictional text
discloses. I will be arguing that Humean skepticism exhibits the self-disclosing characteristics
and the indeterminacy that Iser finds characteristic of the fictional text. See Iser 220.
2 For Cartesian, Lockean, and Hobbesian Crusoes, see Peter Hulme 112; Watt, Rise chaps. 1 and 2;
Carol Kay chaps. 1 and 2.
3 For a different account of Hume’s relationship to eighteenth-century fiction, see Rebecca Tierney-
Hynes.
4 I follow Jane Bennett and depart from Charles Taylor in conceiving of both enchantment and
wonder not as fundamentally theological orientations but as moods or affects that might arise in
any encounter with the new and strange. See Bennett 5 and Taylor, Secular Age 25–26.
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secularized.5 Each of these responses has an either/or logic to it; enchantment is
either here or there; it is either open or covert; it is either supernatural or secular. In
the account I give here, however, wonder responds precisely to the indeterminacy
of a world poised between competing explanatory systems.6 Instead of arguing,
then, like one recent study, that early eighteenth-century fiction produces enchant-
ment by shielding the reader from reality’s randomness, I suggest that eighteenth-
century fiction produces wonder by plunging its reader into the radical indeter-
minacy that Hume’s epistemology reveals (Molesworth 14). In arguing this, I show
how eighteenth-century fiction enchants not despite but because of its skeptical
impulses. Rather than predicating fiction’s ability to enchant either on its mystified
nature or on its demystified nature, I argue that its unlikely alignment with both
providentialism and Humean skepticism makes eighteenth-century fiction an agent
of enchantment. This intervention gets us beyond both the disenchantment thesis
and those critiques of it that reinforce its either/or logic.
The revelation that the world before us confounds our efforts to know it not only
encourages an attitude of cognitive provisionality consistent with fiction, it also
becomes a source of vertiginous pleasure, an important component of which
includes what James Noggle calls ‘‘the skeptical sublime’’ (4). Defoe’s and Hume’s
mutual affinity for the skeptical sublime challenges assumptions about periodi-
zation and literary aesthetics—in particular, the assumed association of both
eighteenth-century novels and empiricist philosophy with realism, understood in
opposition to aesthetic experiences including the uncanny, the marvelous, and the
sublime.
In the pages that follow, I locate Hume’s critique of induction in a dissenting
Protestant tradition of emphasis upon the contingency of experience and go on to
interpret his famous meditation on his skeptical doubts at the conclusion to book 1
of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) as a Crusoe-like riff on spiritual autobio-
graphy. The second half of the essay suggests that Hume’s essay ‘‘Of Miracles’’
(1748) theorizes the pleasure of suspended disbelief in ways consistent with
Defoe’s novelistic practice, a practice that adopts what I identify as the Humean
perspective of viewing the ordinary as if it were miraculous, an aesthetic pleasure
that becomes crucial to the emergence of a discourse of fictionality.
Specters and Skeptics
Let me begin by briefly recapping Hume’s critique of induction. Hume decon-
structs the opposition between inductive belief and vulgar superstition by showing
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5 Arguments that refute Weber’s thesis in these three ways, respectively, include Jane Shaw, Sasha
Handley, Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Terry Castle, Jesse Molesworth, Victoria
Nelson, Bennett, Simon During, and Michael Saler.
6 In this respect, I depart from Taylor’s view that, in the eighteenth century, ‘‘particular provi-
dences, and miracles, are out’’ (Secular Age 233). Rather, I argue for special providence’s con-
tinued relevance and power in the period precisely because it becomes contested and unstable,
a situation that yields not a secure ‘‘buffered self,’’ in Taylor’s terms, but rather profound
cognitive dissonances (37–41).
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that the inductive belief that the future will necessarily be like the past is as irrational
as classifying an extraordinary phenomenon as a miracle (Treatise 113; Enquiry 46).
He proposes that ‘‘in the most usual conjunctions of cause and effect we are as
ignorant of the ultimate principle, which binds them together, as in the most
unusual and extraordinary’’ (Treatise 267). When we suppose the existence of a
necessary connection between cause and effect, every moment that meets with our
expectation must be hailed as a veritable miracle. Our perception that there is a
‘‘necessary connexion,’’ he maintains, ‘‘proceeds merely from an illusion of the
imagination; and the question is, how far we ought to yield to these illusions’’
(ibid.). Hume offers no alternative to these illusions. All we will gain from his
radical skepticism, in his own words, is ‘‘to be sensible of our ignorance,’’ not to
‘‘augment our knowledge.’’ In his resolution of these skeptical doubts, Hume
defines real belief as ‘‘nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what
attends the mere fictions of the imagination’’ (Enquiry 33).
Hume refuses to distinguish ‘‘rational’’ beliefs from superstitious ones. As
Margaret Russett describes the implications of Hume’s attitude toward causality:
‘‘[S]uperstitious or magical thinking seems by this [Hume’s] account not a habit
inimical to causality, but rather, its shameful secret’’ (172–73). Hume’s own shame-
ful secret relates to his expose´ of the superstitious thinking at the heart of our
belief in causality, an expose´ that itself exemplifies superstitious thinking. Hume’s
hypervigilance toward the specter of necessary connection typifies a superstition
characterized by the ‘‘irrational fears of unreal entities,’’ a definition of superstition
that emerges in the late seventeenth century (Daston and Park 337). His skepticism
magically transforms ordinary belief into belief in miracles, recasts common sense
as a conspiracy theory, and, in Tobin Siebers’s phrase, ‘‘remains superstitious about
any claim for the validity of belief’’ (34).7
Hume’s pronouncements upon the nature of superstition and skepticism point
to their affinities. One of the qualities Hume attributes to superstition is that ‘‘it
seizes more strongly on the mind [than philosophy], and is often able to disturb us
in the conduct of our lives and actions’’ (Treatise 271–72). By Hume’s own admis-
sion, skepticism produces the same effect: upon claiming that ‘‘very refin’d reflec-
tions have little or no influence upon us,’’ Hume immediately rebuffs himself,
acknowledging that his ‘‘present feeling and experience’’ attest, on the contrary, to
philosophy’s having ‘‘heated my brain’’ with its ‘‘intense’’ effects (Treatise 268).
More particularly, Hume’s urgent doubt evokes religious conviction of the
radical Protestant variety. For both, a grueling doubt renders fit a worthy faith.
Hume understood that doubt is no stranger to faith, suggesting of ‘‘the conviction
of the religionists, in all ages,’’ that ‘‘their assent in these matters is some unac-
countable operation of the mind between disbelief and conviction, but approaching
much nearer to the former than to the latter’’ (‘‘Natural’’ 348). Though he contrasts
such religious conviction to ‘‘solid belief’’ in ‘‘common affairs,’’ his own attitude to
matters of fact is characterized precisely by this equivocation or what he refers to
elsewhere as a ‘‘total suspense of judgment’’ (Dialogues 56).
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Like Hume, Protestant dissenters were connoisseurs of uncertainty. The eigh-
teenth century witnessed the rise of a providentialism that cultivated a vigilant
‘‘watchfulness’’ in Protestant dissenters as they observed and pondered the mean-
ing of divine signs (Jacob and Kadane 25; see also Manning 9 and Walsham 6).
This watchfulness resulted in a ‘‘doubt-ridden’’ spiritual practice ‘‘governed more
by negation than affirmation’’ (Jacob and Kadane 27, 34). David D. Hall suggests
that, for Puritans, wonders expressed the ‘‘radical contingency’’ of the world. He
explains: ‘‘[I]t came down to this, that nothing was secure, that no appearance of
security could hide the mystery beneath’’ (94). Hume’s suggestion that the ‘‘nec-
essary connexion’’ we perceive between cause and effect is illusory also reveals the
world to be characterized by radical contingency.
The obverse of the stress that such radical contingency produces is the privilege
of wonderment when events go smoothly, as Crusoe attests following his conver-
sion: ‘‘[T]ho’ he [mankind] walks in the midst of so many thousand dangers, the
sight of which, if discover’d to him, would distract his mind, and sink his spirits;
he is kept serene, and calm, by having the events of things hid from his eyes,
and knowing nothing of the dangers which surround him’’ (155). Like Crusoe’s,
Hume’s vision is of a world in which the average person lives in ignorant bliss,
lulled into a false sense of security by illusory appearances. Both Crusoe and Hume
shatter these illusions by revealing the ordinary world to be beset by hidden
mysteries and dangers. Their defamiliarization of the ordinary world generates a
wonder at existence’s continuity that evokes the Puritan sense that ‘‘our whole life’’
is ‘‘a continued deliverance’’: this refers not only to the belief that ‘‘we are daily
delivered’’ from particular evils ranging from ‘‘the violence of the creature’’ to ‘‘the
treachery of our own hearts’’ (Beadle 62, line 14–18) but also to the conviction that
life’s very continuity depends upon ‘‘as it were a continued Creation’’ (Ames 42), a
belief that resembles Hume’s proposal that all of the world’s operations are
attributable to a contingent constant conjunction rather than a necessary connection
between cause and effect. Both perceptions render life’s continuity as miraculous as
its very existence in the first place.8 Complacency characterizes the vulgar rather
than the skeptic, the sinner rather than the convert, whose faith is a covenant that is
daily renewed in recognition of God’s ongoing deliverance. For Hume, this faith
will take the form of faith in his senses, which is the endpoint of his skeptical
odyssey, more precious for being hard-won.
Drawing a parallel between Puritan religious faith and Hume’s faith in his
senses challenges the idea that ‘‘when the Enlightenment thinker takes, say the
reliability of his senses ‘on faith,’ he is not making an act of faith resembling that of
the religious believer’’ (Gallagher and Greenblatt 165). Catherine Gallagher and
Stephen Greenblatt contend that ‘‘the dialectic of faith and doubt belonged to the
old regime; Enlightenment man comes to know only the play of certainty and
uncertainty’’ (ibid.). I would submit that Puritan religious faith and the Enlight-
enment thinker’s trusting of his senses on faith are both acts hard-won and fraught
with anxiety and thus, at least in terms of their affective dimensions, not as
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8 For an elaboration of the principle of providential ‘‘conservation’’ described here, see William
Ames 41–42.
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fundamentally different as they might seem. As Susan Manning writes, ‘‘[A]t
moments in Hume’s writing the engulfing emptiness of the sceptical position
becomes a journey to the heart of darkness, a Calvinist quest for the meaning
hidden at the centre of significance,’’ and the narrative payoff of this journey still
hangs on the ‘‘crucial turn from despair to faith’’ (45, 46).
Hume’s understanding of sensory perception as a form of faith extends the view
of earlier skeptical empiricists. Discussing the skeptical response to naive empir-
icism, Michael McKeon suggests that Lord Shaftesbury views the ‘‘claim to histo-
ricity in these narratives’’ as ‘‘a new brand of ‘faith’ ’’ (117; emphasis added).
Humean skepticism extends this critique of narrations of matters of fact to matters
of fact per se. Where Locke suggests that our own knowledge and reason is ‘‘natural
revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light and fountain of all knowledge,
communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach
of their natural faculties’’ (Locke 698), Hume takes this analogy a step further,
suggesting that our trust in this ‘‘natural revelation’’ is itself a species of faith. The
point of Hume’s skeptical critique, to borrow Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s charac-
terization of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, who promotes this view of Hume in the
1780s, is ‘‘to prove that the sensuous evidence itself was a species of Faith and
Revelation’’ (qtd. in Schrickx 815–16). It is here that a correlation emerges between
the skeptic’s self-conscious faith in matters of fact and the Puritan’s faith in a divine
grace; the skeptic regards the knowledge of the senses with the same lack of
complacency as that with which the Puritan regards God’s grace. While McKeon
treats Crusoe as a relatively stable embodiment of naive empiricism, Crusoe’s reli-
gious ideology functions as a skeptical critique of naive empiricism, because it
suggests that all is not as it seems (McKeon 120, 206). Where Terry Castle empha-
sizes that, in the eighteenth century, faith in the reality of thoughts produces
skepticism about matters of fact, the inverse is also true: in the eighteenth century,
skepticism about the reality of thoughts (that is, about the skeptical impulse itself )
ultimately produces a renewed faith in matters of fact (137).
Reluctant Pilgrims
As a superstitious thinker in skeptic’s clothing, Hume fittingly employs ‘‘the lan-
guage of Protestant spiritual autobiography,’’ including ‘‘images of light and dark,
shipwreck and shoals,’’ when he launches into his famously morose introspection
bemoaning the intellectual paralysis that his critique of causation induces toward
the end of book 1 of the Treatise, ‘‘Of the Understanding’’ (Pinch 41). Hall suggests
that ‘‘sea-deliverances’’ formed a genre of wonder-narrative emphasizing that
‘‘prophecy, prodigy, providence . . . were the stuff of everyday experience’’ (89); it
thus makes sense that Hume would use the seafaring metaphor to reflect upon his
conclusion that the regularity of everyday experience is as prodigious as that which
interrupts it (see Starr 95 and Hunter 62–63). Noggle notes that, in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century literature, boundless seas frequently figure ‘‘the mind lost in
radical skepticism’’ (4).9
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Hume’s use of seafaring imagery simultaneously harnesses traditional Protes-
tant imagery and revises the famous Lucretian figure in which the shore-bound
spectator regards an imperiled ship with pleasure (see Lucretius, On the Nature of
Things book 2). As Hans Blumenberg discusses, the philosopher is traditionally
associated with the spectator, whose pleasure reflects the Epicurean’s ‘‘possession
of an inviolable, solid ground for one’s view of the world’’ (26). In Hume’s hands,
the philosopher’s ‘‘solid ground’’ dissolves beneath his feet as, in Steve Mentz’s
terms, the philosopher’s ‘‘dry’’ investigation becomes ‘‘wet.’’ Rather than portray
the philosopher as surveying the shipwreck of human life from the safety of the
shore, the Treatise plunges Hume’s first-person philosophical persona into the
medium he is investigating: experience. Hume’s reclaiming of the shipwreck as a
paradigm for philosophizing is most obviously apparent in book 1’s conclusion,
which adopts the foolhardy sea voyager’s point of view.
Reading Crusoe and the Treatise together, we can at once interpret Crusoe’s
marooned plight as a literalization of the post-Cartesian philosophical erosion of
the self and Hume’s philosophy as a secular reinterpretation of Puritan spiritual
anxiety. More specifically, I will be arguing that Hume expresses the crisis of
confidence that besets him at the end of book 1 in terms that suggest that his
philosophical speculations and rhetorical flights of fancy have landed him in a
bleak yet exotic location strangely evocative of Crusoe’s lone island. Why would
Hume assume the perspective of the shipwrecked traveler? In Hume’s Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion (1779), the character Philo suggests that when we
engage in ‘‘theological reasonings,’’ ‘‘we are like foreigners in a strange country to
whom everything must seem suspicious’’ (10). By demonstrating how metaphys-
ical assumptions underwrite our common-sense beliefs, Hume recasts the ordinary
world as a ‘‘strange country’’ in which we are all marooned.10
Recasting the ordinary world as a ‘‘strange country’’ figures the cognitive
estrangement that skepticism induces, an estrangement that momentarily stalls
habitual thought processes. Hume views the condition of being suspended
between habitual perception and estrangement from habit as one of skepticism’s
most profound effects. In the Dialogues, Philo suggests that in a skeptical disposi-
tion ‘‘the mind must remain in suspense’’ between ‘‘scepticism’’ and ‘‘common
life’’; and ‘‘it is this very suspense or balance which is the triumph of scepticism’’
(Dialogues 10). This state of suspense evokes the Todorovian ‘‘hesitation’’ ‘‘between
real and unreal’’ associated with the fantastic (Todorov 167). Both early eighteenth-
century fiction’s and empiricist philosophy’s contradictory imperatives create this
sense of hesitation or wonder, in the terms of eighteenth-century critics. In the case
of both Crusoe and Hume’s Treatise, the reader is, as Jayne Lewis observes of Cru-
soe’s reader, ‘‘suspended between conviction of the story’s reality and certainty that
it has been made up’’ (Lewis 49).
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10 On this passage, see Manning 167. See also Gilles Deleuze’s characterization of Hume’s
empiricism as ‘‘a kind of universe of science fiction: as in science fiction, the world seems
fictional, strange, foreign, experienced by other creatures; but we get the feeling that this world
is our own, and we are the creatures’’ (162).
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Defoe’s and Hume’s use of Puritan spiritual autobiography also suspends the
reader between literal and figurative reading (see Starr, esp. chap. 3; Hunter;
Damrosch 187–212; Valenza 138; Manning chap. 2). In both cases, this use of a
confessional, first-person register belies a more complex relationship between text
and ‘‘self.’’ Defoe famously equivocates between presenting Crusoe as his protag-
onist’s literal autobiography and as Defoe’s own ‘‘allegorical’’ autobiography (Ser-
ious Reflections 4). Hume famously regards personal identity as ‘‘fictitious,’’ thereby
priming his reader to regard his sudden assumption of a pathetic first-person
persona somewhat ironically (Treatise 259). However, his self-recorded struggles
with periods of debilitating melancholy invite a more literal interpretation.
Hume’s account of this melancholy in a 1734 letter adopts the spiritual auto-
biographical mode while shifting its narrative model ‘‘off an Augustinian body/
soul axis and onto a secularized Cartesian body/mind axis’’ (Valenza 152). Yet even
as Hume secularizes the spiritual autobiography, he parallels his situation to that of
spiritual diarists and wonders whether the ‘‘rapturous Admirations’’ of ‘‘Mysticks’’
and ‘‘Fanatics’’ ‘‘might discompose the Fabric of the Nerves & Brain, as much as’’
his own ‘‘profound Reflections’’ (‘‘A Kind of History’’ 349). By comparing his
skeptical reflections to mystics’ fits of wonderment, Hume locates his philosophical
discomposure within a tradition of sublime revelation.
Hume returns to the genre of spiritual autobiography and the discourse of
sublime revelation in the conclusion to book 1 of the Treatise, where they are
invoked in order to give expression to the ‘‘violent’’ intensity, as Robin Valenza
characterizes it, of Hume’s reaction to the philosophical conundrums he has raised
(140). This section of the Treatise illustrates Noggle’s contention that the eighteenth
century witnesses a convergence between skeptical and sublime discourses, which
share a vision of the human intellect overwhelmed by vast external objects (12). In
the readings of Crusoe and the Treatise that follow, I want to show how a poetics of
the skeptical sublime fosters the conditions for wonder at the ordinary. One must
go through the experience of being shipwrecked, whether actually or vicariously,
in order to wonder at the miracle of dry land. Or, in other words, wonder is what
happens on the way back to reality from estrangement. In order to see how this
works, we first have to accompany Crusoe and Hume on their perilous voyages into
the skeptical sublime.
Hapless Mariners
The famous final section of book 1 of the Treatise vividly illustrates John Richetti’s
observation that ‘‘the modern philosopher-writer is a man alone, a sort of voluntary
Robinson Crusoe’’ (Richetti 7). Having philosophically exiled himself with the
articulation of his skeptical doubts, Hume pauses before ‘‘launch[ing] out’’ into
‘‘those immense depths of philosophy, which lie before [him],’’ finding himself
inclin’d to stop a moment in my present station, and to ponder that voyage, which I
have undertaken. . . . Methinks I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals,
and having narrowly escap’d ship-wreck in passing a small firth, has yet the temerity
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to put out to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition
so far as to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous circumstances.
(Treatise 263)
Hume’s slightly archaic, Scottish register—apparent in the use of ‘‘Methinks’’
and ‘‘firth,’’ referring to an estuary—signals his turn to the anachronistic spiritual
autobiographical mode. Hume’s comparison of himself to a man who goes to sea
despite having narrowly escaped shipwreck evokes Crusoe’s acknowledgment of
the perversity of his desire to go to sea despite earlier ill-fated voyages. The parallel
shifts from pre-marooned to post-marooned Crusoe when Hume, reduced ‘‘almost
to despair,’’ resolves ‘‘to perish on the barren rock, on which I am present, rather
than venture myself upon that boundless ocean, which runs out into immensity’’
(264).11 Crusoe likewise terms his abode ‘‘The Island of Despair,’’ echoing Puritan
spiritual autobiographies in which a crisis of despair precedes conversion (Crusoe
57; Starr 44).
Crusoe and Hume both imagine themselves ostracized and alienated from human
society. Crusoe reflects that he ‘‘seem’d banish’d from human society . . . alone,
circumscrib’d by the boundless ocean, cut off from mankind,’’ while Hume pres-
ents himself as one ‘‘who not being able to mingle and unite in society, has been
expell’d all [sic] human commerce, and left utterly abandon’d and disconsolate’’
(Crusoe 124; Treatise 264). In his tally of the goods and evils he has experienced in
being stranded on the island, Crusoe notes down matter-of-factly, ‘‘I am divided
from mankind, a solitaire, one banish’d from human society’’ (Crusoe 54). Hume
likewise bemoans that his philosophy has placed him in a state of ‘‘forelorn soli-
tude’’ and imagines himself ‘‘some strange uncouth monster’’ (Treatise 264). Crusoe
also describes his appearance as ‘‘monstrous’’ and ‘‘frightful’’ (Crusoe 119). Images of
storms figure this sense of monstrosity and isolation, Hume imagining onlookers
who dread ‘‘that storm, which beats upon me from every side,’’ while Crusoe
explains that his despair ‘‘would break out upon me like a storm’’ and is tormented
by a vision of a man who descends ‘‘from a great black Cloud’’ to berate him (Treatise
264; Crusoe 90, 70).
What are we to make of the fact that both Crusoe and Hume figure themselves as
monsters dogged by their own personal storms? The readiness with which Crusoe
and Hume imagine themselves in these vividly estranging terms suggests the
susceptibility of both to self-conjured illusion, which in each case is the cause and
not merely the effect of their fear. For example, after famously seeing a single
footprint on the beach of his supposedly deserted island, Crusoe begins to per-
suade himself that the footprint may have been a ‘‘chimera’’ or ‘‘delusion’’ and that
he may have ‘‘play’d the part of those fools, who strive to make stories of spectres,
and apparitions, and then are frighted at them more than any body’’ (Crusoe 125).
Hume’s paranoia is comparable; as we have seen, his skeptical doubts, which he too
refers to as ‘‘these chimeras,’’ conjure up monsters and storms, functioning as the
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equivalent of Crusoe’s ‘‘stories of spectres and apparitions’’ by which he proves to
be ‘‘frighted’’ ‘‘more than any body.’’ Earlier in the Treatise, Hume ventures that
although ‘‘modern philosophy’’ ‘‘pretends’’ to be founded upon ‘‘solid, permanent’’
principles, in truth its tenets are as much like ‘‘the spectres in the dark’’ as the
‘‘fictions’’ of ‘‘the antient philosophers’’ (226). Hume exposes the phantasmic nature
of modern philosophy’s ‘‘solid, permanent’’ principles, showing how they confuse
a feeling of solidity with the solidity of the object itself. It is precisely by bringing to
light these ‘‘spectres in the dark’’—what John Bender describes as ‘‘the apparitional
quality of sensory perception’’—that Hume frightens himself (Bender 226, 234).12
Hume’s dramatization of his skeptically induced fears evokes his own charac-
terization of superstition as ‘‘a state of mind’’ in which ‘‘infinite unknown evils are
dreaded from unknown agents; and real objects of terror are wanting,’’ leading the
soul to find imaginary objects of terror ‘‘to whose power and malevolence it sets no
limits’’ (‘‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’’ 144–45). Like Crusoe, Hume confronts
the possibility that what he thought was real (his skeptical doubts) may have been
‘‘chimeras’’ and that in critiquing induction he may have been making ‘‘stories of
spectres and apparitions’’ by which he is ‘‘frighted’’ ‘‘more than anybody.’’
By likewise foregrounding reality’s apparitional nature in the footprint scene,
Crusoe also draws attention to what Bender calls ‘‘the apparitional quality of real-
ism,’’ reminding the reader that the quality that elicits Crusoe’s belief in the
footprint—its apparent reality—also solicits the reader’s belief in Crusoe (Bender
232). Crusoe thematizes, then, its own apparitional literary effects, its production of
cognitive uncertainty paralleled in the three English sailors’ response to Crusoe’s
‘‘spectre-like figure’’: ‘‘like one astonish’d,’’ the Captain wonders aloud, ‘‘is it a real
man, or an angel!’’ (Crusoe 200). Crusoe’s island experience estranges him from his
fellow Englishmen to the extent that he challenges not only cultural but ontological
categories. In the sailors’ response to Crusoe, we begin to see how the sublime’s
aesthetics of fear crosses over into uncertainty’s aesthetics of wonder.
Crusoe embodies here neither the recurrence of the repressed associated with
the uncanny nor the terror associated with the sublime but the indeterminacy that
produces wonder. The sailors’ ontological wonder—is he man or angel?—mirrors
the epistemological wonder into which the text’s alternately allegorical and literal
claims plunge the reader: is Crusoe real or fantasy? Crusoe and Hume both observe
this correspondence between the fictional and the spectral. As Hume puts it,
poetical enthusiasm is ‘‘the mere phantom of belief or persuasion’’ (Treatise 630). As
Crusoe observes in ‘‘A Vision of the Angelick World,’’ the phrase ‘‘seen a spirit’’
means ‘‘seen an apparition, for to see a spirit seems to be an allusion, not an
expression to be used literally, a spirit being not visible by the organ of human
sight’’ (Serious Reflections 3). Crusoe suggests here that to see an apparition is, lit-
erally, to have a figurative experience and, like the reader of fiction, to be at once
susceptible to the illusion and conscious of it.
Defoe and Hume frequently draw attention to the reader’s susceptibility to self-
conjured illusion. Defoe warns, ‘‘Above all, I would beg my reading, merry friends,
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of the thoughtless kind, not to be so much surprised at the apparitions of their own
brains’’ (History and Reality of Apparitions 392). Hume’s essay ‘‘Of Miracles,’’ having
debunked miracles and argued for Christianity’s dependence upon them, con-
cludes with the wonderfully ironic observation that ‘‘whoever is moved by Faith to
assent to [the Christian Religion], is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding and gives him a
determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience’’ (Enquiry
90). Apparitions and miracles abound in the acts of self-deception that take place in
our ‘‘own brains’’ and ‘‘own person.’’
Even as Defoe and Hume point out the human susceptibility to self-conjured
illusions, their own literary effects—and the wonder these effects invite—also
depend upon the reader’s vulnerability to such illusions. Before returning to the
rhetorical parallels between Crusoe and Hume’s respective epiphanies, let us
see how Hume’s manipulation of the most prominent figure in the Treatise’s
conclusion—the shipwreck—at once exploits and alerts his readership to this
vulnerability. Richetti famously reads the conclusion to book 1 of the Treatise as ‘‘a
comic transition’’ (200). However, Hume’s own reflections in book 3 of the Treatise,
‘‘Of Morals,’’ upon the difference in effect between faint and strong imaginative
suppositions, suggest that the tone of book 1’s conclusion may come closer to the
tragic. Hume returns in book 3 to the Lucretian paradigm, this time without
seeming to revise it: he engages in a thought experiment in which he places himself
in the position of Lucretius’s hypothetical spectator observing a situation that bears
a striking resemblance to that described from a first-person perspective in the
conclusion to book 1: a ship, ‘‘tost by a tempest, and in danger every moment of
perishing on a rock or sand-bank’’ (Treatise 594). Revisiting from a third-person per-
spective the same shipwreck scene he earlier describes from a first-person per-
spective aptly conveys the toggling between immersion and estrangement inher-
ent in Hume’s philosophical position.
Also aptly, the apparent distance between these first-person and third-person
perspectives reveals itself as illusory. As Richetti notes, in book 3, Hume revises his
initial proposition as he observes that while the faint depiction of the ship is too
weak for him to gain pleasure from his comparative safety, the strong depiction of
the ship catalyzes not pleasure but distress, as he imaginatively hears the passen-
gers’ ‘‘lamentable cries’’ and finds himself unable to ‘‘withstand the motions of the
tenderest compassion and sympathy’’ (Treatise 594; see Richetti 26). In other words,
the power of empathy is such that the dry spectator who merely imagines the
suffering of the ship’s passengers gets wet, in Mentz’s terms—perhaps even liter-
ally, with tears. The philosopher toggles between passenger and spectator and, in
so doing, enacts the dialectic between immersion and detachment that Duncan
finds characteristic of Hume’s thought—immersion being figured by the philos-
opher’s imaginative submersion in the sea (123).
Hume’s treatment of the Lucretian shipwreck-with-spectator trope in book 3
helps explain his use of the shipwreck metaphor at the end of book 1, since, in
assuming the role of the shipwreck’s spectator in book 3, Hume in effect assumes
the position of the reader of the conclusion to book 1. Hume’s thought experiment
in book 3 reveals that a vivid account of the shipwreck, such as the conclusion to
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book 1 provides, disables the spectator from assuming the complacency that
comedy usually bolsters in its audience. Instead of having his preconceptions
confirmed, then, by being vicariously shipwrecked, the philosopher finds himself
‘‘surprised by an actual world’’ (Richetti 26). In Blumenberg’s words, ‘‘Terra firma is
not the position of the spectator but rather that of the man rescued from shipwreck;
its firmness is experienced wholly out of the sense of the unlikelihood that such a
thing should be attainable at all’’ (21–22).
After examining the shipwreck scene in book 3, we are in a position to see that
Hume’s assumption, in book 1, of the sea voyager’s persona puts the reader in the
position of the vicariously immersed spectator, thereby conferring upon the reader
the same opportunity to be surprised by an actual world. In other words, one must
go through the experience of shipwreck in order to perceive and appreciate the
miracle of ‘‘the reliability of firm ground,’’ in Blumenberg’s words (21). The ship-
wreck metaphor at the conclusion to book 1, then, does not merely figuratively
render Hume’s own skeptically induced disorientation but also acts upon the
reader to produce the very disorientation it describes, an effect consistent with
Hume’s view that sympathy is transmitted by contagion rather than imaginative
projection (see Fleischacker). He produces, that is, through the medium of print,
what he is feeling through the experience of philosophizing rather than inviting
the reader to imaginatively project himself or herself into his philosophically
induced feeling. Novel literary effects are necessary to recruit the attention of
readers who, according to Hume’s own theory of man, are necessarily deadened by
custom and habit.13 Literary interventions of this sort are precisely what lend the
Treatise what Hume describes as ‘‘an air of singularity, and novelty as claim’d the
attention of the public’’ (Treatise 643)—a novelty that contemporary reviews noted,
as we shall see.
If such literary gambits are novel in philosophical texts, they are the bread and
butter of sermons, Hume’s rhetorical strategy borrowing from those preachers
whose popularity, Hume observes, depends on their capacity to ‘‘excite the most
dismal and gloomy passions’’ (Treatise 115). Imaginative representations like the
shipwreck that are at once powerfully affective and self-consciously literary engage
attention by exploiting readers’ susceptibility to illusory representations at the
same time that they alert them to this vulnerability, producing what Duncan calls a
‘‘doubled consciousness’’ (123). By engaging conviction and skepticism simulta-
neously, the shipwreck figure therefore engages the very same ‘‘suspense of
judgment’’ that is one of skepticism’s most profound effects.
Shared Epiphanies
It is not only figures like the shipwreck but also the Puritan spiritual autobio-
graphical mode more broadly that conveys and cultivates ‘‘suspense of judg-
ment.’’ While tortured by divisions, Puritan writing also exhibits the ‘‘ability to
hold ‘either/or’ steadily in the mind as ‘both/and’ ’’ in a balancing act evocative of
Humean double consciousness (Manning 18). Yet achieving such balance is rare for
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both Puritan and skeptic; more often, the effect of such divisions is to produce a
disorienting ‘‘sense of being at sea in a world of threateningly significant but
seemingly random facts’’ (15). In both Crusoe and the Treatise, the image of tracking
anonymous footprints figures the bewilderment of a seeker in search of revelation.
While a literal footprint in the sand triggers Crusoe’s paralysis of judgment, the
task of detecting more abstract footprints prompts Hume’s doubt: ‘‘[C]an I be sure,
that in leaving all establish’d opinions I am following truth; and by what criterion
shall I distinguish her, even if fortune shou’d at last guide me on her foot-steps?’’
(Treatise 265).
In the midst of their existential crises, both Crusoe and Hume express their
doubts by asking open questions, a hallmark of seventeenth-century spiritual
autobiographies.14 At the height of his philosophical discomposure at the end of
book 1, Hume asks, ‘‘Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my
existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and
whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? [O]n whom have I any
influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded with these ques-
tions’’ (Treatise 269).
Hume’s plea for illumination echoes the questions Crusoe asks following his
illness: ‘‘And what am I, and all the other creatures, wild and tame, human and
brutal, whence are we? Sure we are made by some secret power, who form’d the
earth and sea, the air and sky; and who is that?’’ (Crusoe 74). Crusoe’s conscience
eventually replies, upbraiding him for his doubts in terms evocative of Bunyan’s
seventeenth-century spiritual autobiography Grace Abounding (1666). In Hume’s
case, a personified, feminized nature famously responds to his cry for help and
proves to be a less severe mistress than Crusoe’s conscience, effectively ‘‘dispelling
these clouds,’’ ‘‘obliterat[ing] all these chimeras,’’ and dissipating his ‘‘philosoph-
ical melancholy and delirium’’ (Treatise 269). Yet for Hume, philosophy swiftly
shifts from ailment to cure. Hume finds that his hope of achieving modest philo-
sophical acclaim ‘‘serves to compose my temper from that spleen.’’ He embraces,
here, a ‘‘careless,’’ ‘‘diffident’’ philosophy that contrasts with his earlier melancholy
and tormented skepticism (273).
The terms in which Hume frames this contrast help explain his choice of the
Puritan spiritual autobiographical mode. As he emerges from the skeptical wil-
derness, Hume pronounces, ‘‘Philosophy on the contrary [from superstition], if
just, can present us only with mild and moderate sentiments’’ (Treatise 272). Hume’s
decision to contrast ‘‘just’’ philosophy with superstition at this juncture retroac-
tively casts the unmitigated skepticism that threatened to engulf him—and by his
account produced severe and immoderate sentiments—as a thinking person’s
superstition. Hume may couch his ‘‘spleen’’ as Puritan spiritual autobiography
precisely to discredit it by identifying melancholy, elsewhere identified with
superstition, as the mark of the spurious skeptic in contrast to the ‘‘diffidence’’ that
characterizes the true skeptic (see Hume, ‘‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’’ 144–
45 and Dialogues 92). His convincing turn as a man in the throes of a philosophy-
induced nervous breakdown suggests that too dogged a commitment to disbelief
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produces the ‘‘bold’’ sentiments and hypotheses associated with superstition.15
Among superstition’s baleful qualities are that it ‘‘opens a world of its own, and
presents us with scenes, and beings, and objects, which are altogether new’’ (Treatise
271). This characterization of superstition echoes Hume’s youthful characterization
of the appeals of philosophy: ‘‘[T]here seem’d to be open’d up to me a new Scene of
Thought, which transported me beyond Measure’’ (‘‘A Kind of History’’ 346).
Hume’s Crusoe-inflected autobiography in the Treatise confirms extreme skepti-
cism’s parallels with superstition by opening up ‘‘a world of its own’’ replete with
‘‘new’’ ‘‘scenes, and beings, and objects’’ in the form, as we have seen, of shipwreck,
monsters, and storms.
Undermining the view that Hume employs Puritan spiritual autobiography as a
way of tarnishing unmitigated skepticism by association with superstition is his
invocation of spiritual metaphors for philosophy in ‘‘A Kind of History of My Life’’
(1734), seemingly to much less calculated effect. But this objection assumes the
Hume of ‘‘A Kind of History’’ to be continuous with the Hume of the Treatise, a
perhaps naive or at the very least un-Humean assumption. Hume may deliberately
conjure up ‘‘A Kind of History’’ in order to renounce this youthful autobiographical
persona and embrace his new persona as the diffident skeptic. Just as Hume’s
critique of induction unleashes doubts that prove to be stubbornly persistent, so
his rhetorical strategies open up interpretive possibilities that defy resolution. In
framing the crisis of belief in such a way as to produce uncertainty as to whether
this is a genuine or ironic crisis of faith, Hume’s ‘‘breakdown’’ elicits the very same
unknowing it dramatizes in the text.
Whether Hume invokes the Puritan spiritual autobiographical mode sincerely
or ironically, having broken free from the superstitious hold of ‘‘refin’d reflections,’’
he comes to a reckoning that at once parallels and reverses Crusoe’s: ‘‘[A]fter
drifting over tempestuous seas, being cast upon shores half a world apart, and
coming close to perishing upon treacherous, unseen rocks,’’ both experience a
conversion (Hunter 200–201). But where Crusoe overcomes his diffidence and is
saved by his commitment to God, Hume overcomes his committed skepticism and
finds salvation in a diffidence that vanquishes skepticism’s specters.
Signs and Wonders
Here I want to contextualize more precisely this kinship between superstition and
skepticism and spell out this kinship’s implications for our understanding of fic-
tion. As I have suggested, Hume’s critique of induction points out the similarities
between everyday causality and belief in miracles by showing how both beliefs
depend on supposing the existence of a necessary connection between events. The
seventeenth-century Protestant doctrine of special providence also blurs the line
between coincidence and miracle, suggesting that just as extraordinary events
might be evidence of God’s hand, so the minute processes of daily life should be
regarded as equally miraculous manifestations of God’s divine will, without which
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the sun might fail to rise, the rain to fall, the crops to grow (Walsham 12). The
creation of the category of special providence meant that Protestants could dis-
credit Catholic miracles as ‘‘lying wonders’’ while tapping into a source of wonder
that was not only legitimate but legitimizing of Protestants’ own divine sanction.16
While miracles violated natural law, special providences worked within it (Hunter
56–57). However, in practice, the distinctions between miracles, providences, and
natural wonders were ‘‘very hazy indeed’’ (Walsham 230).
Special providence counterintuitively provides an epistemological paradigm for
legitimate empirical belief because believers in special providences suspend their
assumption that the future will be like the past, appreciating that such a turn of
events is entirely contingent upon God’s grace. Like Humean skepticism, the
‘‘puritan propensity for detecting the finger of God in the most mundane events’’
emphasizes that the most ordinary beliefs depend on faith (Walsham 20).17 What
does it feel like to suspendthe assumption that the future will be like the past? In his
analysis of the psychology of natural philosophy, one that is deeply indebted to
Hume, Adam Smith describes such an experience as ‘‘the feeling of something like
a gap or interval betwixt [conjoined objects]’’ when ‘‘[the fancy] naturally hesitates,
and, as it were, pauses upon the brink of this interval’’ (‘‘Principles’’ 41). Smith
terms this feeling ‘‘wonder.’’ This feeling is often linked, in the eighteenth century,
to the experience of extraordinary, rather than ordinary, special providences—
indeed, to miracles, as Hume observes in his discussion ‘‘Of Miracles’’:
The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable
emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events, from which it is
derived. And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure imme-
diately, nor can believe those miraculous events, of which they are informed, yet love
to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and
delight in exciting the admiration of others. (Enquiry 78)
This passage presents the skeptic (who cannot believe in miracles) as retaining
common sense while partaking ‘‘of the satisfaction at second-hand.’’ The skeptic’s
susceptibility to wonder causes him or her to enter vicariously into the miracle, to
act as if he or she believes in the miracle by suspending disbelief—that is, skepti-
cism. This ‘‘as if’’ belief in miracles is analogous to the skeptic’s belief in matters of
fact, as Hume characterizes it: in both cases, feeling overrides skepticism and
compels belief, a belief that the skeptic inhabits unselfconsciously even as his or her
underlying skepticism enables him or her to regardthis unselfconscious belief from
an estranged vantage point: this is ‘‘that very suspense or balance’’ that Philo
identifies as skepticism’s triumph (Dialogues 10). This simultaneous holding in the
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mind of willed and unwilled belief resembles ‘‘the poised holding of opposites’’
that Manning identifies in Puritan writing (18). While Lorraine Daston rightly
observes that willed philosophical skepticism differs from unwilled religious faith
(23–24), both Humean skepticism and Calvinist faith involve a similar toggling
between willed and unwilled belief, whether between predestination and free will
or between philosophical skepticism and belief in matters of fact.
Arriving at this position, in which belief in matters of fact coexists with an
appreciation of their contingency, shifts the skeptic toward the insight that the
everyday instances of cause and effect upon which life depends might be a spec-
tacular series of remarkable coincidences: vertiginous suspense gives way to awed
amazement when the skeptic can be at once immersed in the everyday and
appreciate the good fortune of its consistency. As Hume puts it in the Enquiry, the
mysterious correspondence between perceptions and objects provides ‘‘ample
subject’’ for ‘‘wonder and admiration’’ (36). In Smith’s terms, wonder at a break in
the expected ‘‘chain of events’’ gives way to admiration at the ‘‘connecting chain’’
(41–42). Philosophy begins in doubtful wonder, then, and concludes in wondering
admiration or recognition. This insight rescues Hume from extreme skepticism;
no longer marooned by doubts, the skeptic is able to wonder at the world while
being in it.
The point that there are similarities between the characteristics that Hume
attributes to his own philosophy and those that he attributes to miracle narratives is
not a new one. Adela Pinch has pointed out that both ‘‘gain people’s credibility
because the stories raise ‘agreeable’ emotions’’ (20). I submit that the correspon-
dence is even more pronounced and that Hume’s philosophy aims not just to
produce ‘‘agreeable emotions’’ but ‘‘surprise and wonder’’ specifically. I have already
suggested that Hume’s ambiguous use of the figure of the shipwreck and of the
Puritan spiritual autobiographical mode suspend the reader between competing
interpretations, cultivating that hesitation that Smith terms ‘‘wonder.’’ Wonder is
also often defined in the eighteenth century as an emotional response to novelty
(see, e.g., Kames 258–59). Early reviews of Hume’s Treatise note his ‘‘Novel Sort of
Diction’’ and remark that ‘‘[t]hose who demand the new will find satisfaction here’’
(qtd. in Mossner 120, 131). What reviewers at the time regarded as the gratuitous
shock value of Hume’s philosophy can be understood as a rhetorical strategy for
recruiting readers’ attention by producing wonder.18
Wonder results not only from skepticism’s style but also from its substance. As
Pinch observes, Hume defines the feeling elicited in the reader of George Berkeley’s
works as ‘‘that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the
result of scepticism’’ (Enquiry 107; see Pinch 20). Hume’s characterization of this
sentiment evokes Smith’s characterization of wonder as ‘‘fluctuation . . . uncertain
and undetermined thought’’ (39). Hume’s account of reading Berkeley, then, sug-
gests that the unruly feelings that skepticism produces in the reader—like those
experienced by the skeptical philosopher himself—resemble wonder, the emotion
that Hume says miracle narratives elicit.
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Imminent Revelations
But what do the feelings supposedly elicited by skeptical philosophy have to do
with fiction? Pinch addresses this question when she wonders, ‘‘[M]ight the vertigo
of skeptical demystification be as narcissistically gratifying as incredible stories?’’
(20). As Pinch’s question implies, epistemological doubt arguably traffics in the
same sensations as the period’s fiction. Just as skeptical demystification gratifies
the philosopher (and by extension, his or her reader) with the self-satisfaction
of enlightenment, so, Hume suggests, the skeptic via miracle narratives gains a
‘‘pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.’’ By way of example, Hume
observes: ‘‘With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travelers received,
their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their relations of wonderful adven-
tures, strange men, and uncouth manners?’’ (Enquiry 78). Hume cites the popu-
larity of travel narrative, the very genre into which he inserts himself in the con-
clusion to book 1 of the Treatise, as illustrating the insatiable appetite for wonder.
One might speculate that Hume is here subtly distancing the Enquiry from the
Treatise’s extravagant rhetoric. However, Hume does not censure either the sup-
pliers or the consumers of such secular wonders, for the very next sentence qua-
lifies the circumstances in which wonder is dangerous: ‘‘But if the spirit of religion
join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense,’’ because nar-
ratees of religious miracle narratives ‘‘renounce’’ ‘‘what judgment they have’’
(Enquiry 78–79). By contrast, the ‘‘love of wonder’’ that the ‘‘relations of wonderful
adventures’’ in the Treatise and Crusoe both stimulate and fulfill depends upon
readers not renouncing but assuming responsibility for their capacity for judgment.
By dint of being only a virtual miracle, the marvelous satisfies the love of wonder
while safeguarding common sense.
The Humean relationship between miracle narratives and wonder that provides
a template for self-conscious faith in matters of fact also provides a paradigm for
suspended disbelief in fiction. In claiming this, I am asserting a kinship between
three unlikely relatives: the seventeenth-century Calvinist doctrine of special
providence; Hume’s Enlightenment skepticism; and the doctrine of ‘‘willing sus-
pension of disbelief’’ as coined by Coleridge.19 Both the Calvinist attitude to mir-
acles and Humean skepticism involve a proto–willing suspension of disbelief.
Neither seventeenth-century Puritan theology nor Hume’s philosophy sanctions
belief in miracles, albeit for completely different reasons. Nevertheless, both con-
done reattaching the ‘‘surprise and wonder’’ associated with miracles to more
appropriate objects. For Hume, those objects are the regular laws of nature
reconceived as a spectacular series of coincidences; for Protestant theology, those
objects are ‘‘special providences’’ which, suggests seventeenth-century theologian
William Ames, may be ‘‘called a Miracle’’ ‘‘by a metonymy of the effect’’ (42). The
world’s regular operation may not be a miracle, but by this logic it may be ‘‘called
a Miracle’’—viewed as if it were miraculous—by virtue of the wonder—the
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‘‘effect’’—it produces.20 As Alexandra Walsham sums up the Calvinist attitude to
prodigies, ‘‘Sometimes the best course of action was a willing suspension of dis-
belief’’ (178).
Defoe’s fiction encourages an ‘‘as if’’ belief congruent with both the doctrine of
special providence and Hume’s critique of induction. My position in observing a
congruency between Defoe’s novel and the Humean critique of induction presents
an alternative to the recent argument that early eighteenth-century novels conspire
to shield their readers from the ‘‘Humean Real’’ (Molesworth 50–51). While Hume
indeed argues that ‘‘fancy’’ shields us from the real, he also makes clear that
renouncing fancy and confronting the real is not an option; indeed, as the con-
clusion to book 1 demonstrates, the real can be apprehended only via fancy—that
is, in the form of storms, shipwreck, and monsters. Such language suggests that if
the Humean real is ‘‘terrible,’’ it is terrible in the way of the sublime—that is to say,
vertiginously thrilling (Molesworth 171). This confrontation with the real—or
fancy’s version of the real—is certainly the climax of Hume’s narrative but not the
whole story, as we have seen, which concludes with the journey back from the brink
to the real world that constitutes Hume’s mitigated skepticism.
Eighteenth-century fiction shares this epistemology of mitigated skepticism, at
once finding terror in life’s randomness and wonder in life’s coincidences, apparent
in Crusoe’s oscillation between the sublime terror of the random footprint—the
impression without a discernible cause—and the wonder of the sprouting corn.
Like the Treatise, Crusoe’s plot prepares its reader to be ‘‘surprised by an actual
world’’ by cramming improbable events between its covers; as the title page boasts,
the narrative concerns not only the ‘‘strange surprizing’’ account of how Crusoe
was marooned but also the account of how he was ‘‘as strangely delivered by
Pyrates’’ (Crusoe 1). Shipwreck, cannibals, pirates—the narrative’s succession of
improbable events resembles a ‘‘whole collection of wonders’’ or ‘‘chain of won-
ders,’’ as Crusoe puts it (203, 15). In this respect, Crusoe embodies what Jesse
Molesworth calls ‘‘Humean verisimilitude’’—the idea that the past is not a reliable
guide to the future—except insofar as Crusoe’s plot suggests that wonders will
never cease (Molesworth 113). And yet, as generations of readers have noticed, its
succession of wonders notwithstanding, the book can also be formulaic, repetitive,
boring. In this way, Defoe’s fiction suspends its reader, as does Hume’s skepticism,
between reflective uncertainty and habitual assent.
At other times, Crusoe’s juxtaposition of the exotic and the banal works to make
the banal wondrous rather than boring. In achieving this effect, the novel harnesses
the perspective cultivated by the tradition of special providences that told people to
register both ‘‘the Extraordinary, as well as the Ordinary stated Signs of God’s Pre-
sence,’’ as Increase Mather puts it (9). While critics have often discussed provi-
dence’s impact on the eighteenth-century novel in terms of general providence’s
pressure to produce ‘‘morally probable’’ stories—that is, narratives consistent with
God’s grand design—the effect I am isolating here, on the contrary, celebrates
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particularity, including both extraordinary phenomena and ordinary phenomena
made extraordinary by cultivating the Puritan habit of reapprehending the banal as
a source of wonder.21 Within such a context, Crusoe’s prolonged attention to the
quotidian is consistent with its promise to deliver the strange and surprising.22
Crusoe offers both strange, surprising adventures and ordinary life made strange
through literary devices—for example, the technique that Watt calls ‘‘delayed
decoding’’—delaying the identification of the described object—which allows
Defoe to narrate Crusoe’s wonder at the sprouting corn in a way that replicates the
surprise for the reader (Conrad in the Nineteenth Century 175). Such devices allow the
reader to regard the novel’s representations of ordinary events—not just the corn
but the whole fabric of modern life, isolated and decontextualized on Crusoe’s
island—as if they were real and as if they were rare, just as Crusoe comes to regard
the corn ‘‘as if it had been miraculous’’ (Crusoe 63–64).
Defoe’s and Hume’s reinvention of the real as an object of wonder is part of a
bigger story—one that includes how eighteenth-century critics conceptualize the
marvelous and the probable as part of a spectrum rather than as binary opposites
andtheorize how narrative might produce the pleasures of wonder and recognition
simultaneously.23 Generic distinctions between realism and the marvelous lose
their usefulness in a period that finds reality to be apparitional (in which case
apparition narratives might be more realist than matter-of-fact ones) and that
argues that the marvelous may become credible through its grounding in concrete
detail.24 For Defoe, Hume, and other eighteenth-century writers, to enchant the real
is not to give up on enlightenment but rather to insist upon the paradox that ‘‘to
understand less, to be ingenuous, to remain stupefied: these are reactions that may
lead us to see more’’ (Ginzburg 13). It is to insist, that is to say, on an enlightenment
that inheres in the suspension of knowing, a suspension that the estrangement
effect of rendering the real marvelous makes possible. The pull in the early eigh-
teenth century at once toward skepticism, toward probabilistic knowledge, and
toward providential belief, allows this suspension and therefore this form of
enchantment to flourish in multiple sites. In such enchanted moments, the real’s
virtual qualities become a source less of epistemological anxiety and more
emphatically of aesthetic pleasure. Instead of understanding skepticism’s rela-
tionship to belief as one of subtraction, the account I have offered here insists upon
skepticism’s addition of ‘‘pleasurable doubt to the Calvinist co-ordinates’’ (Manning
44). In Defoe’s and Hume’s narratives, we encounter the precursors to our own
slippery sensibilities—the ‘‘ironist’s faith’’ or the ‘‘modernist’s vertiginous sense of
contingency’’—as well as the insight that the invented narratives that tell of such
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feelings are also their richest source (Gordon 655). Precisely by exploiting the
power of words on a printed page to both uncannily simulate and unnervingly
undermine a sense of the real—both to enchant and to disenchant—these narra-
tives do not merely recount but also produce the real as a source of wonder.
Works Cited
Adorno, Theodor W., and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Verso,
1997.
Ames, William. The Marrow of Sacred Divinity, Drawne out of the Holy Scriptures, and the
Interpreters Thereof, and Brought into Method. London: Printed by Edward Griffin for
Henry Overton, 1642.
Batsaki, Yota. ‘‘Monstrous Philosophy: Hume to Frankenstein.’’ Beyond Reasonable Doubt
conference. University of Cambridge. 2007.
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb. Reflections on Poetry; Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s
Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus Trans. William B. Holther and
Karl Aschenbrenner. Berkeley: U of California P, 1954.
Beadle, John. A Critical Edition of John Beadle’s A Journall, or Diary of a Thankfull Christian.
Ed. Germaine Fry Murray. New York: Garland, 1996.
Bender, John. ‘‘The Novel as Modern Myth.’’ Defoe’s Footprints: Essays in Honour of Max-
imillian E. Novak. Ed. Robert M. Maniquis and Carl Fisher. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2009.
223–37.
Bennett, Jane. The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. Princeton:
Princeton UP, 2001.
Blumenberg, Hans. Shipwreck with Spectator: Paradigm of a Metaphor for Existence. Trans.
Steven Rendall. Cambridge: MIT P, 1997.
Breitinger, Johann Jacob. Critische Dichtkunst. Ed. Wolfgang Bender. 2 vols. Stuttgart: Met-
zler, 1966.
Castle, Terry. The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and the Invention of the
Uncanny. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995.
Christensen, Jerome. Lord Byron’s Strength: Romantic Writing and Commercial Society. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins UP, 1993.
Damrosch, Leopold. God’s Plot and Man’s Stories: Studies in the Fictional Imagination from
Milton to Fielding. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1985.
Daston, Lorraine. ‘‘Scientific Error and the Ethos of Belief.’’ Social Research 72.1 (2005): 1–28.
Daston, Lorraine, and Katharine Park. Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150–1750. New
York: Zone, 1998.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
358 NOVEL FALL 2014
NOVEL473_01Kareem_1pp.3d 08/19/14 10:38am Page 358
Davis, Lennard J. Factual Fictions: The Origins of the English Novel. Philadelphia: U of
Pennsylvania P, 1997.
Defoe, Daniel. The History and Reality of Apparitions: The Novels and Miscellaneous Works of
Daniel De Foe. Vol. 13. New York: AMS, 1973. 20 vols.
———. Robinson Crusoe. Ed. John Richetti. London: Penguin, 2003.
———. Serious Reflections during the Life and Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe: With
His Vision of the Angelick World. Written by Himself. London, 1720. Eighteenth Century
Collections Online. Gale. 27 Mar. 2012. <https://library.villanova.edu/Find/Record
/807647>
———. A System of Magick; or, a History of the Black Art. London, 1727. Eighteenth Century
Collections Online. Gale. 1 Jan. 2010. <http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?
&source=gale&prodId=ECCO&userGroupName=uclosangeles&tabID=T001&docId
=CB132724032&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCOArticles&version=1.0&docLevel
=FASCIMILE >
Deleuze, Gilles. ‘‘Hume.’’ Trans. Michael Taormina. Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–
1974. Ed. David Lapoujade. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004. 162–69.
Descartes, Rene´. ‘‘The Passions of the Soul.’’ Trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross.
The Philosophical Works of Rene´ Descartes. Vol. 1. New York: Dover, 1931. 329–427.
Duncan, Ian. Scott’s Shadow: The Novel in Romantic Edinburgh. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007.
During, Simon. Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic. Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 2002.
Fleischacker, Samuel. ‘‘Sympathy in Hume and Smith: A Contrast, Critique, and Recon-
struction.’’ Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl: A Collection
of Essays. Ed. Christel Fricke and Dagfinn Føllesdal. Frankfurt: Ontos, 2012. 273–311.
Gallagher, Catherine. ‘‘The Rise of Fictionality.’’ The Novel. Ed. Franco Moretti. Vol. 1.
Princeton: Princeton UP, 2006. 336–63.
Gallagher, Catherine, and Stephen Greenblatt. ‘‘The Novel and Other Discourses of Sus-
pended Disbelief.’’ Practicing New Historicism. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000. 163–210.
Gildon, Charles. ‘‘The Life and Strange Surprizing Adventures of Mr. D—— De F.’’ Robinson
Crusoe Examin’d and Criticis’d. Ed. Paul Dottin. 2nd ed. London: Dent, 1923. 63–180.
Ginzburg, Carlo. ‘‘Making It Strange: The Prehistory of a Literary Device.’’ Trans. Martin
Ryle and Kate Soper. Wooden Eyes: Nine Reflections on Distance. New York: Columbia UP,
2001. 1–24.
Gordon, Peter E. ‘‘The Place of the Sacred in the Absence of God: Charles Taylor’s A Secular
Age.’’ Journal of the History of Ideas 69.4 (2008): 647–73.
Hall, David D. Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Religious Belief in Early New
England. New York: Knopf, 1989.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
KAREEM RETHINKING THE REAL 359
NOVEL473_01Kareem_1pp.3d 08/19/14 10:38am Page 359
Handley, Sasha. Visions of an Unseen World: Ghost Beliefs and Ghost Stories in Eighteenth-
Century England. London: Pickering, 2007.
Herrick, James A. The Radical Rhetoric of the English Deists: The Discourse of Skepticism, 1680–
1750. Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1997.
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994.
Hulme, Peter. ‘‘Robinson Crusoe and Friday.’’ Post-colonial Theory and English Literature:
A Reader. Ed. Peter Childs. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1999. 108–19.
Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Ed. Henry D. Aiken. New York: Haf-
ner, 1948.
———. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding [with] A Letter from a Gentleman to His
Friend in Edinburgh. Ed. Eric Steinberg. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977.
———. ‘‘A Kind of History of My Life.’’ The Cambridge Companion to Hume. Ed. D. F. Norton.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993. 345–50.
———. ‘‘The Natural History of Religion.’’ Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Ed.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Vol. 2. Aaalen: Scientia, 1964. 309–63.
———. ‘‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm.’’ Essays Moral, Political, and Literary. Ed.
T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. Vol. 1. Aaalen: Scientia, 1964. 144–50.
———. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978.
Hunter, J. Paul. The Reluctant Pilgrim; Defoe’s Emblematic Method and Quest for Form in
Robinson Crusoe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1966.
Iser, Wolfgang. ‘‘Feigning in Fiction.’’ Identity of the Literary Text. Toronto: U of Toronto P,
1985. 204–28.
Jacob, Margaret C., and Matthew Kadane. ‘‘Missing, Now Found in the Eighteenth Century:
Weber’s Protestant Capitalist.’’ American Historical Review 108.1 (2003): 20–49.
Kames, Henry Home. ‘‘Lord.’’ Elements of Criticism. Ed. Peter Jones Vol. 1. Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 2005. 2 vols.
Kareem, Sarah Tindal. ‘‘Lost in the Castle of Scepticism: Sceptical Philosophy as Gothic
Romance.’’ Fictions of Knowledge: Fact, Evidence, Doubt. Ed. Yota Batsaki, Subha Mukherji,
and Jan-Melissa Schramm. New York: Palgrave, 2012. 152–73.
Kay, Carol. Political Constructions: Defoe, Richardson, and Sterne in Relation to Hobbes, Hume,
and Burke. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1988.
Lewis, Jayne. ‘‘The Atmospheres of Robinson Crusoe.’’ Defoe’s Footprints: Essays in Honour of
Maximillian E. Novak. Ed. Robert M. Maniquis and Carl Fisher. Toronto: U of Toronto P,
2009. 32–54.
Livingston, Donald W. Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume’s Pathology of Philosophy.
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
360 NOVEL FALL 2014
NOVEL473_01Kareem_1pp.3d 08/19/14 10:38am Page 360
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford:
Clarendon, 1979.
Lucretius Carus, Titus. Of the Nature of Things. Trans. William Ellery Leonard. Perseus
Digital Library. < http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext
%3A1999.02.0131%3Abook%3D2%3Acard%3D1 > (accessed 3 June 2014).
Manning, Susan. The Puritan-Provincial Vision: Scottish and American Literature in the Nine-
teenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.
Mather, Increase. Kometographia; or, A Discourse Concerning Comets. Boston: Printed by
S. G. [Samuel Green] for S. S. [Samuel Sewall], 1683.
McFarland, Thomas. ‘‘The Willing Suspension of Disbelief.’’ Shapes of Culture. Iowa City:
U of Iowa P, 1987. 114–45.
McKeon, Michael. The Origins of the English Novel, 1600–1740. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP,
1987.
Mentz, Steve, ‘‘The Wet and the Dry,’’ The Bookfish: Thalassology, Shakespeare, and Swimming
(blog) 24 Nov. 2010 <http://stevementz.com/page/29 > .
Molesworth, Jesse. Chance and the Eighteenth-Century Novel: Realism, Probability, Magic.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010.
Moretti, Franco. ‘‘Serious Century.’’ The Novel. Ed. Franco Moretti. Vol. 1. Princeton: Prin-
ceton UP, 2006. 364–400.
Mossner, Ernest Campbell. The Life of David Hume. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980.
Nelson, Victoria. The Secret Life of Puppets. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003.
Noggle, James. The Skeptical Sublime: Aesthetic Ideology in Pope and the Tory Satirists. Oxford:
Oxford UP, 2001.
Pinch, Adela. Strange Fits of Passion: Epistemologies of Emotion, Hume to Austen. Stanford:
Stanford UP, 1996.
R. B. The Surprising Miracles of Nature and Art: In Two Parts. London: Printed for Nath.
Crouch, 1685.
Richetti, John. Philosophical Writing: Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983.
Ricoeur, Paul. Time and Narrative. Vol. 1. Trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer.
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1984. 3 vols.
Russett, Margaret. ‘‘Narrative as Enchantment in the Mysteries of Udolpho.’’ ELH 65.1
(1998): 159–86.
Saler, Michael. As If: Modern Enchantment and the Literary Prehistory of Virtual Reality. New
York: Oxford UP, 2012.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
KAREEM RETHINKING THE REAL 361
NOVEL473_01Kareem_1pp.3d 08/19/14 10:38am Page 361
Schrickx, W. ‘‘Coleridge and Friedrich Henrich Jacobi.’’ Revue belge de philogie et d’histoire 36
(1958): 812–50.
Shaw, Jane. Miracles in Enlightenment England. New Haven: Yale UP, 2006.
Siebers, Tobin. The Romantic Fantastic. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1984.
Smith, Adam. ‘‘The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries, Illustrated
by the History of Astronomy.’’ Essays on Philosophical Subjects. Ed. W. P. D. Wightman and
J. C. Bryce. Vol. 3. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1982. 33–105.
Starr, G. A. Defoe and Spiritual Autobiography. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1965.
Taylor, Charles. A Secular Age. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007.
———. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.
Tierney-Hynes, Rebecca. ‘‘Hume, Romance, and the Unruly Imagination.’’ Studies in English
Literature, 1500–1900 47.3 (2007): 641–58.
Todorov, Tzvetan. The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre. Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1975.
Valenza, Robin. ‘‘Editing the Self: David Hume’s Narrative Theory.’’ Eighteenth Century:
Theory and Interpretation 43.2 (2002): 137–60.
Vogt, Philip. ‘‘Seascape with Fog: Metaphor in Locke’s Essay.’’ Journal of the History of Ideas
54.1 (1993): 1–18.
Walsham, Alexandra. Providence in Early Modern England. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.
Watt, Ian. Conrad in the Nineteenth Century. Berkeley: U of California P, 1979.
———. The Rise of the Novel. Berkeley: U of California P, 1957.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
362 NOVEL FALL 2014
NOVEL473_01Kareem_1pp.3d 08/19/14 10:38am Page 362
